

<CN>Chapter 5

<CT>Indigenous Women and Culture in the Colonized Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh

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In the early hours of June 12, 1996, the day of the Bangladesh national election, an indigenous woman political activist named Kalpana Chakma was abducted from her home at Lallyaghona Village in the Rangamati District of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). Kalpana was the Organising Secretary of the CHT Women's Federation, an organization working for the human rights and security of the CHT's indigenous people, who had been subject to decades of violent colonization by Bangladesh armed forces and transmigrants. Kalpana came from a landless, internally displaced refugee family that had been evicted from its original home in the 1960s when the creation of Kaptai hydroelectric dam inundated Rangamati, the largest town in the CHT, and many other villages, rendering one-third of the entire population of the CHT homeless. Her family did not own any cultivable land. Two of her six brothers worked on other people's land as day laborers. Unlike her brothers and sisters, Kalpana was fortunate enough to receive the support of a local Buddhist monk to enable her to continue her studies. At the time of her abduction she was a BA student at Baghaichari Kachalong College and lived with her two brothers, her sister-in-law, and her elderly widowed mother.

Kalpana was allegedly abducted at gunpoint by a group of security personnel led by lieutenant Ferdous Kaiser Khan, commander of the Kojochari military camp (17 East Bengal Regiment) situated near her village. She was abducted from her home along with her two brothers, and in front of her mother and sister-in-law. Kalpana and her two brothers' hands were tied and they were blindfolded. One brother was taken knee-deep into the lake by one of the abductors, who had been ordered to shoot him. However, he managed to escape into the darkness. Hearing the gunfire, the other brother jumped into the water. The abductors shot at

him but he too escaped. Kalpana was heard crying “dada, dada” (“brother, brother”). She has not been seen since.

In 2005, *Dulu Kumuri*, the first motion picture to be produced, directed, and acted by indigenous people from the CHT, was released.¹ It tells a customary tale of the abduction of a young woman, Dulu Kumuri, by a hawk (*chil* or *chile*) and the efforts of her seven brothers to find and return her to the family home. Films about the CHT are uncommon. A film by the indigenous people of the CHT, telling their own story, is unique. Between 2005 and 2006, the film was reported to have been viewed by one third of the indigenous population of the CHT.

The film is set on traditional *jum* land in the CHT. *Jum* is the slash and burn farming method of the CHT around which the life-world of its indigenous peoples once revolved. It is very different from the plow farming practiced by Bengalis on the generally flat plains of Bangladesh. Recognizing this as a focal point of difference, Bengalis disparagingly referred to the eleven indigenous groups living in the CHT who practiced *jum* cultivation as “Jummas.” The term has been adopted with some pride as a signifier of unity between the otherwise culturally diverse indigenous groups living in the CHT.

In the story, Dulu Kumuri, the youngest, most spoiled child in the family, lives in the *jum* house with her seven brothers and her sister-in-law, the wife of the eldest brother. The film portrays indigenous people enjoying life, engaging in traditional food gathering, hunting, and fishing along with leisure activities including playing customary games (*ghile khaaraa* and *shaamuk khaaraa*), composing songs (*ubagiit*), and playing traditional instruments (the *khengarang*, a form of mouth organ). The life evoked is idyllic—mixing fun, jokes, and teasing among the brothers, sister, and sister-in-law, with a sense of caring for each other—an inevitably stark contrast to the contemporary condition of fear and military oppression.

Once, when the seven brothers were away on a traditional gathering expedition (*kaartton*, usually to collect bamboo or timber building materials, medicine, and other resources from the depths of the forest), Dulu Kumuri’s sister-in-law beseeches a high-flying

hawk, who is carrying a piece of dry fish (*aangar maach*, a small shark, which is a delicacy for the Jummas particularly living in the high mountains far away from the sea), to exchange the fish for Dulu Kumuri, who is lazily playing *ghile khaaraa* (a game involving throwing a large seed) in the front yard of the *jum* house.

The sister-in-law panics when she finds that Dulu Kumuri has actually disappeared. She searches for her throughout the village but without success. When the brothers return from the safari she sends them to look for Dulu Kumuri. After an exhaustive search deep in the forest, and consulting with a traditional clairvoyant (*baidya*), the brothers finally locate Dulu Kumuri in the hawk's nest, atop a tall tree. The brothers build a ladder, joining bamboo upon bamboo, to reach the nest, and Dulu Kumuri is finally rescued. When the eldest brother learns about his wife's bargain with the hawk he becomes furious. But Dulu Kumuri with her six other brothers help make peace between the couple. Dulu Kumuri and the brothers forgive the sister-in-law and the extended family move beyond the dreadful event, bringing a happy conclusion to the story.

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While countless abductions and other acts of sexual repression against CHT indigenous women go unnoticed, the abduction of Kalpana Chakma by a military officer attracted national and international attention from human rights organizations,² foreign parliaments,³ and UN agencies.⁴ The national media of Bangladesh, which remained largely silent for decades on sexual oppression against CHT women, played an important role in publicizing Kalpana's abduction. The abduction was held up as irrefutable evidence of military atrocities against the indigenous women of the CHT.

When I interviewed the writer-director of *Dulu Kumuri*, Tarun Chakma, he stated that he had not intended the film to carry any contemporary political message.⁵ Yet indigenous viewers are struck by the contrast between the film's joyful ending and the high-profile unresolved abduction of Kalpana Chakma.

The appearance of the motion picture, far from being a cultural aberration, is the manifestation of a four-decade revitalization of indigenous culture that occurred as a mode of resistance to the violent colonization of the lands of the indigenous peoples of the CHT by Bangladesh armed forces and transmigrants. Indigenous women have been particularly targeted in the colonization. But in response, indigenous women and their cultural traditions have played a particularly prominent role in the cultural resurgence that has brought a sense of unity in adversity to the otherwise disparate indigenous groups in the CHT. In this chapter we look at both the ways in which indigenous women of the CHT come to symbolize the vulnerability of these communities and the role played by indigenous women in the cultural resurgence signified by a film like *Dulu Kumari*.

<A>Transmigration and Colonization in Decolonized Bangladesh

The CHT is the southeastern hilly region of present day Bangladesh, and conjoins South and Southeast Asia. The CHT is bordered by the Indian states of Tripura and Mizoram in the north and east, the Burmese states of Chin and Rakhine (or Arakan) in the east and south, and two districts of Bangladesh—Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar—in the west. The CHT itself is comprised of three districts: Khagrachari in the north, Rangamati at the center, and Bandarban in the south.

The CHT is the traditional homeland of eleven ethnolinguistically and religiously diverse *adibasi* (*adivasi*, *adibashi*), or indigenous peoples,⁶ who collectively call themselves the Jumma. Listed alphabetically, they are the Bawm, Chak, Chakma, Khumi, Khyang, Lushai, Marma, Mro, Pangkhua, Tanchangya, and Tripura.⁷ The 2001 (2003 “provisional”) census listed the indigenous population in the CHT as 736,682. Numerically Chakmas are the largest (about half the Jumma population), followed by Marmas, Tripuras, Mros, Tanchangyas, Bawms, Pangkhuas, Chaks, Khyangs, Khumis, and Lushais. The Chakma and Tanchangya languages are classified as Indo-Aryan languages; the other nine languages are Tibeto-Burmese.⁸ Chakmas, Marmas, Tanchangyas, Chaks, and Khyangs primarily follow

Buddhism, Tripuras follow Hinduism, Lushais, Pangkhuas, and Bawms follow Christianity. Mros and Khumis are most diverse in their religious practices, following Buddhism, Christianity, and a new religion, Krama.⁹ All eleven Jumma groups have animist rituals, which give a unique inflection to their religions. Recently, there have been conversions within indigenous groups to Christianity and Islam, the major religion in Bangladesh.¹⁰

The CHT has a different precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial history from the rest of Bangladesh.¹¹ British annexation occurred in 1860, one hundred years after the colonization of Bengal (the eastern part of which is now Bangladesh). There was resistance from the CHT against British aggression from 1772 to 1798, referred to by historians as “*chakma bidroha*” or the Chakma Resistance.¹² It is the first recorded resistance against the British, occurring long before the famous “*sipahi bidroha*” (Sepoy Rebellion) in 1857, which is often erroneously referred to as the first uprising against the British in South Asia.¹³ At the departure of the British from India in 1947, the CHT was left under the control of a new “colonial” power, East Pakistan. Control moved to Bangladesh when it gained independence from Pakistan in 1971.

Soon after the rejection of the demand by CHT leaders for retention of CHT’s autonomous status in the 1972 constitution of Bangladesh, the government began to suppress the early stages of a CHT autonomy struggle that eventually saw the emergence of an armed resistance guerilla group, the Shanti Bahini (peace force). The CHT became fully militarized in August 1975 when Bangladesh was brought under military rule as a result of a coup in which President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated. Since 1975 Bangladesh has had both military and democratic governments, but the CHT has remained under military occupation. In 1991 an international human rights panel, the CHT Commission, estimated that there was one member of the security force for every ten hill people in the CHT.¹⁴

The high military presence did not change even after the signing of the “CHT Accord” in December 1997, which ended more than two decades of armed struggle for

autonomy by the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS or JSS).¹⁵ While the JSS demobilized the Shanti Bahini as part of the Accord, the Bangladesh government, in contravention of the Accord, maintained its heavy military presence in the CHT. UN Special Rapporteur Lars-Anders Baer, in his 2011 report to the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), recorded that one-third of the Bangladesh military is stationed in the CHT, a tenth of the land area of the country,¹⁶ with about 1 percent of its population. Baer notes the occurrence of “arbitrary arrests, torture, extrajudicial killings, harassment of rights activists and sexual harassment,”¹⁷ and the retention of so-called “Operation Uttoron” (Upliftment), an executive order that allows the military to interfere in civil matters beyond its jurisdiction.¹⁸ Baer also points out that the most important provisions of the Accord—including settlement of land disputes, demilitarization, and the devolution of authority to CHT institutions—remain either unimplemented or only partially implemented.¹⁹ The Bangladesh military now has 6 permanent cantonments (barracks) in the 3 districts of the CHT. This appears excessive considering there are only 14 cantonments in the rest of the 61 districts of Bangladesh and that the CHT is not a war zone, nor is there now any counter-insurgency.

Soon after the removal of the Pakistani colonizers in 1971, Bangladesh itself began active and systematic colonization of the CHT. This was carried out by two means: introducing a policy of transmigration involving mass settlement of Bengalis from the plains to the CHT; and adopting a policy of state acquisition of the lands of indigenous people.

The policy of mass transmigration was conceived in 1978-1979, without public disclosure and without discussion with CHT leaders. The government implemented the policy by circulating secret memoranda and using its civil administration and military. Between 1979 and 1985, 400,000 Bengalis from the plains were settled in the CHT in three phases using government-financed transportation and transit accommodation. They were provided with land, cattle, cash, food rations, building materials, and military protection. Each settler family of the first phase of transmigration was promised five acres of land; each

family of the second phase was promised either 2.5 acres of plain land, or 4 acres of plain and bumpy mixed land, or 5 acres of hilly land; the third phase had similar incentives.²⁰ Since 1979 the state has been distributing free food rations, and in 2006 it was reported that the government gave 38,000 metric tons of free food rations every year to the settlers.²¹ In contrast, a 2009 UNDP survey shows that indigenous people suffer widespread food poverty with 65 percent categorized as “absolute poor” and 44 percent as “hardcore poor.”²²

Lack of usable land in the CHT has meant that it has been impossible to allocate the promised amount of land to such a large number of settlers. The scarcity of usable land in the hilly terrain of the CHT and its limited carrying capacity was formally assessed by the British as early as 1918, when the predominantly indigenous population of the CHT was only about 200,000. A British government-commissioned report by F. D. Ascoli that year stated, “It is not possible to estimate the area still available for plough cultivation, but it is certain that it alone would not be sufficient to support the mass of the *jumia* [Jumma] population.”²³ At that time, the British colonial rulers felt it was necessary to restrict the migration of people from the plains to protect the agro-*jum*-forestry based economy of the CHT.

The shortage of usable land in the CHT was exacerbated in the early 1960s when the Kaptai hydroelectric dam created the Kaptai Lake. The lake displaced 100,000 Jummas, nearly one-third of the CHT population,²⁴ mostly Chakmas, submerging numerous homes, villages, and towns, including the Chakma Raja’s palace complex. The lake also inundated 54,000 acres of plow land, which was 40 percent of the CHT’s best agricultural land, and seventy square miles of reserve forest.²⁵ As compensation, the government could only return the equivalent of one-third of the lost land. In the absence of cultivable land, over 40,000 displaced Jummas were forced to emigrate to India, where many still remain “stateless persons.”

Because all available land in the CHT suitable for habitation and cultivation had been allocated by the end of the 1960s,²⁶ there was no land suitable for plow agriculture available

when the Bengali transmigrants started arriving in 1979. To settle the 400,000 transmigrants in the already land-scarce CHT, one “solution” involved appropriation of 20,000 acres of land from the southern portion of the Kassalong reserve forest.²⁷ Another more violent “solution” involved “the government ... ejecting the hill people from their traditional lands.”²⁸ This resulted in an escalation of retaliation attacks on settlers and the military by the Shanti Bahini. Reprisal attacks by the Bangladesh military on the Shanti Bahini, and indiscriminate attacks by the military and other security personnel on Jumma civilians, often used the transmigrants as human shields.

The government’s acquisition of indigenous peoples’ common²⁹ and private lands has been achieved by means that were often illegal, or by amending existing laws and enacting new laws without public discussion. Land acquisition has been facilitated through three state agencies: the Forest Department; military and paramilitary forces; and civil administration.

Even though a quarter of the land in the CHT had since 1883 been classified “reserve forests,” from the 1980s the Forest Department actively attempted to seize more lands belonging to indigenous peoples in the name of creating additional “reserve forests.” By 2010, a total of 140,000 acres had been gazetted as “reserve forests” through notification.³⁰ Rather than protect the forests, large parts of the existing “reserve forests” are being denuded by corrupt Forest Department officers and their powerful cronies.³¹

From the 1970s, sections of the military and paramilitary began acquiring the common and private land of indigenous peoples to expand their establishments. The Bangladesh army currently occupies 500 acres at its Ruma barracks and is attempting to occupy a further 9,560 acres.³² The Bangladesh air force is attempting to acquire thousands of acres in Bandarban. In June 2010, the Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB) initiated acquisition of more land for a new battalion headquarters at Ruma,³³ potentially making large numbers of Jummas homeless. On May 3, 2011, as protest against possible eviction from their ancestral homes and lands, hundreds of Jummas marched along the tortuous 37km road

from Ruma to Bandarban, the major town of the district.³⁴

Since 1979, the civil administration of the CHT, through the deputy commissioners' offices, has been leasing out lands on a long-term basis for the establishment of "industrial plants" and commercial plantations, including rubber and horticulture. The leased lands are mostly the common lands of the indigenous peoples from within the "unclassified forest," traditionally used for *jum* agriculture, grazing, herding, hunting, gathering, and forest regeneration. The lands have mostly been leased to non-CHT residents who are high-ranking Bengali elites, including civil servants, military officials, political leaders, business entrepreneurs, professionals, and their relatives. From 1979 to 2010, over 40,000 acres were acquired by Bengali elites as plantation leases.³⁵ These acquisitions are increasing, as many influential elites incrementally grab the land bordering their leased property.³⁶

Ultimately, in implementing the policy of mass transmigration and land acquisition under military occupation, the state's actions (and inactions) served to encourage transmigrants to violently take over lands belonging to the Jummas, evicting hundreds from their homes, using sexual violence against indigenous women,³⁷ and committing massacres (examples of "creeping genocide").³⁸ The outcome of the transmigration program is that from the mid to late 1980s, 70,000 Jummas were forced to flee their homes to take shelter in India, a conservative estimate of 300,000 Jummas became internally displaced persons (IDPs),³⁹ and the number of deaths remains unknown.

The implementation of the policy, which increased the nonindigenous Bengali population by 150 percent between 1974 and 1991,⁴⁰ has resulted in a drastic change in the demography of the CHT. The 1991 census disclosed that the Bengali population had reached nearly 50 percent of the population of the CHT.⁴¹ The 2011 census avoided providing separate figures for Bengalis and indigenous peoples, perhaps to intentionally conceal the demographic hegemony of Bengalis in the CHT.

Contestation between Bengali settlers and Jummas over land, and the biased

intervention of the occupying military and paramilitary by bypassing or obtaining support from the civil administration, has turned the post-accord CHT into an endemic conflict zone.⁴² The ongoing CHT conflict, primarily grounded in attempts to grab indigenous people's land, is evident in mass attacks that have occurred in the post-accord CHT. These include violent incidents in Baghaihat (Sajek) on February 19-20, 2010, and Guimara (Ramgarh) on April 21, 2011, which were documented by many national and international news media and human rights organizations.⁴³ Many organizations also asked the government to conduct impartial inquiries into the incidents and bring the perpetrators to justice. But as with previous attacks against Jummas, the government has not taken any steps toward an impartial inquiry into the recent incidents.

Although the government transmigration program formally stopped in 1985, there has been continuing support from the civil administration for self-motivated Bengali migration to the CHT, including distribution of land under various names or projects.⁴⁴ The government silence about the violent land-grabbing incidents during the pre- and post-Accord period, including consistent maintenance of a “culture of impunity” toward the alleged criminal settlers and security personnel, suggests covert continuation of the transmigration policy of 1979-1985.

Political analyst Amena Mohsin points out that after 1975, “though Bengali nationalism became more territorial, it didn't become less linguistic or cultural; rather religion added a new element to our nationalism.”⁴⁵ The 1975 inclusion by the state of the Islamic ideals soon materialized in the country's legal system. By proclamation of order no. 1, 1977, the constitution incorporated “BISMILLAH-AR-RAHAMN-AR-RAHIM” (In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful) at the top of its preamble, and under the same proclamation the principle of secularism in Article 8 was replaced with “The principles of absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah, nationalism, democracy and socialism meaning economic and social justice, together with the principles derived from them ... shall

constitute the fundamental principles of state policy” (Article 8(1)). Finally, Islam was declared the state religion of Bangladesh by the 8th Amendment of the constitution on June 7, 1988.

The Islamization of the CHT is evident in the rapid increase of Islamic institutions from the 1970s. In 1961 there were 40 mosques in the CHT; the number increased to 200 in 1974; and 592 in 1981. There were only 2 *madrasas* (Islamic schools) in 1961; the number jumped to 20 in 1974, and 35 in 1981.⁴⁶ Extrapolating from the figures of the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) demonstrates that from 1982 to 2001 the number of mosques in the CHT increased over four-fold and *madrasas* over forty-four fold. Incorporating the 2001 BBS data on the three districts of the CHT shows that there were 2,297 mosques compared to 1,471 Buddhist temples, 415 Hindu temples, and 366 churches. The 2011 census provides no updated statistics.⁴⁷

For the historian Marc Ferro, “Colonization is associated with the occupation of a foreign land, with its being brought under cultivation, with the settlement of colonists.”⁴⁸ But in the case of the CHT, it is *not* a foreign land being occupied, but a land within the decolonized state that has a different political and administrative history and different ethnic demography, languages, cultures, and religions, being colonized in the name of Bengali-Islamic nationalism. This nationalist-motivated colonization of the CHT within a decolonized Bangladesh is the result of a colonial nation-building project by the post-colonial nation state of Bangladesh.⁴⁹

<A>Indigenous Women and Violence Under Colonization

Indigenous women of the CHT, living in a colonized enclave of decolonized Bangladesh, inhabit a different political space from their nonindigenous Bengali sisters, a political space in which they are violently targeted on the basis of ethnicity and gender. While it has been argued that there is a strong strategic use of gender-based group identity in assaulting “women as women and men as men,”⁵⁰ it has also been illustrated that all wars do not involve

indiscriminate rape.⁵¹ Unlike the Bangladesh war of independence when both Bengali women and non-Bengali Urdu-speaking Bihari women were sexually abused by men allegedly from the enemy side,⁵² sexual abuse during and after the CHT's armed conflict appears to solely affect indigenous women. While there have been sexual attacks on Jumma women, initially by Bengali soldiers and later also by Bengali settlers, there have not been allegations of sexual violence against Bengali women by Jumma guerrillas or Jumma men, during or after the insurgency.

During the armed conflict, institutional policies and strategies of the state selectively discriminated on the basis of indigenous women's ethnicity and gender. One example is a secret memorandum circulated to army officers in 1983 encouraging them to marry indigenous women from the CHT.⁵³ Through this memorandum, which continues to have far-reaching implications, the state singled out indigenous women from their own (Bengali) women and likewise singled out indigenous women from indigenous men. It would seem that the stationing of Bengali army officers in the CHT as part of the ongoing military occupation of the CHT was not enough, the policy was also to occupy women's bodies, to colonize women through forced marriage.

The policy memorandum of 1983 resulted in a violent turn, with marriages occurring after abduction or intimidation. In one such case in the Rangamati District of the CHT, it is reported that "[an army] Captain of the Division who was posted near the village, used to frequently visit the school with some of his friends. He ordered that two or three girls of class eight and nine should parade in front of him each day so he could pick one as his bride. He liked a girl called Shikha and harassed her continuously by going to her house. Shikha was not at all interested or inclined to marry the Captain. But the Captain and his friends harassed and threatened her parents and neighbours so often that they were coerced into making Shikha agree to marry. When the marriage took place ... They also physically forced the villagers to attend the wedding. After their marriage it was reported that the Captain used to

make Shikha wear traditional Chakma attire thus showing everybody that he was respectful to her tradition!!”⁵⁴

The involvement of a ranked military officer in the case of the abduction of Kalpana Chakma is also significant, as the incident may be seen as an outcome of the attitude encouraged by the memorandum condoning forced marriage of military officers to Jumma women. Initially, there was an effort from the military to render the abduction “an elopement.” Unable to provide any evidence of the elopement, the military authority then changed its position. On June 18, 1996, the twenty-fourth infantry division distributed leaflets in the CHT, including from a helicopter, announcing an award of Tk 50,000 for information on the whereabouts of Kalpana. Nobel Peace laureate and founder of the Grameen Bank, Mohammad Yunus, having been appointed as an adviser to the caretaker government, inquired about the alleged abduction. The military’s chief commanding officer told Yunus that it was “a matter of heart” (*hridayghatita*),⁵⁵ implying that Kalpana had eloped with her alleged abductor. Kalpana is still listed as missing and the perpetrators have not yet been brought to justice.

Sexual violence against indigenous women has been instrumental in the forced relocation of Jummas from their homes and lands. It has been observed that “mass rape and sexual violence on Pahari [Jumma] women in the attacks on their villages was a key factor in making their communities leave to seek shelter elsewhere, thereby providing occasion for their lands to be taken over.”⁵⁶ Many Jummas relocated themselves to India or other parts of the CHT for protection, particularly for protection of female members of their families.

Some Jummas were forced by the military to move to cluster villages—variously referred to by names such as *joutha khamar* (cooperative farms), *gucchagram* (cluster villages), and *adarshagram* (model villages)—as a part of the government’s counter-insurgency measures.⁵⁷ Relocation of Jummas to cluster villages began in 1979 with the pretext of providing livelihoods and establishing the rule of law in the CHT. The actual

motivation, and the real effect, appears to be to eliminate the Jumma's traditional dispersed pattern of settlement, to restrict their mobility, and seize their land. Cluster villages were built with funds from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and people from the cluster villages were used as workers for their associated rubber plantations and horticulture. The homes and lands of Jummas relocated to cluster villages were appropriated by the military, Bengali transmigrants, or at times government departments, which then leased out the lands.

Women who were forced to live in cluster villages were particularly vulnerable to sexual violence. After visiting the CHT and five of the six refugee camps in the Tripura state of India, the CHT Commission recorded many accounts of relocated women who had been raped, gang raped, abducted, forcibly converted to Islam, or forcibly married. A woman interviewed at a refugee camp who had escaped a forced marriage, told the Commission that she was abducted while walking to the fields with her six-year-old niece. She described being imprisoned for three months and forcibly converted to Islam.⁵⁸ A man in a refugee camp stated, "I was forced to live in a cluster village. We had to come here [to India] because we have a teenage daughter and we were afraid that she would be raped by the army."⁵⁹ A refugee woman who was kidnapped from a cluster village in 1986, but escaped to a refugee camp in 1988, narrated how she was forced to marry her kidnapper and had two children by him. After escaping she returned to the cluster village, but could not find her relatives as the village had been taken over by Bengalis.⁶⁰

The Bangladesh military are involved in the sexual violence against indigenous women. In 1989, a woman working in a rubber plantation in the CHT told the Commission that "The army raped some of the women, especially college students and women working in offices. Many girls were taken to the army camp, raped repeatedly, then released after one week."⁶¹ The Commission summarized the situation, stating that "Rape is used systematically as a weapon against women in the CHT."⁶²

There is no complete record of the number of sexual violence cases that have

occurred in the CHT or their details. Among a limited number of partial records, Ume Mong, an indigenous woman leader, estimated that from December 1971 to 1994 a total of 2,500 indigenous women were raped.⁶³ A pre-Accord report of 1995 documented that “Over 94% of the all alleged cases of rape of Jumma women between 1991-1993 in the CHT were by ‘security forces.’” Of these, over 40 percent of the victims were alleged to be children.⁶⁴ Sexual violence did not cease in the post-Accord period. Records indicate that between 2003 and 2006, 27 percent of all rape cases were committed by security personnel and the rest by Bengali settlers.⁶⁵ The most recent reports show that sexual abuse of Jumma women by Bengali men remains endemic.⁶⁶

The state’s indifference to violence against Jumma women is in stark contrast to the state’s condemnation of the sexual abuse of Bengali women by West Pakistani soldiers during Bangladesh’s 1971 War for Independence. Although the 1971 wartime sexual violence against women had been treated with inaction by successive Bangladesh governments, social welfare organizations, and the families of the women,⁶⁷ progressive civil society continued to seek justice for the women. From the early 1970s until recently, Bangladesh governments played perhaps a duplicitous role. The state occasionally used wartime rape stories strategically to attract international attention, particularly for financial and technical support in the rebuilding of the country during and after the conflict.⁶⁸ After the 1971 war, the state recognized wartime rape victims through speeches, government documents, and the press,⁶⁹ awarding them the status of war-heroines, “*birangana*.” But for thirty-eight years the state took no concrete action to seek justice for them. From 1975 to 1990, during the military autocracy, public movements for justice in relation to war violence were suppressed,⁷⁰ but from the early 1990s when parliamentary democracy returned to the country robust public attempts were made to gain justice.⁷¹ In 2009, as a result of nearly two decades of public outcry, and to meet its 2008 preelection commitment, the Awami League government sought assistance from the UN to provide justice to the 1971 rape victims.⁷² The

state set up the International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh (ICTB) in March 2010,⁷³ and the ICTB commenced its first trial in August 2011.⁷⁴

By contrast, the Bangladesh government appears blind to sexual violence against Jumma women in the CHT. The tenth session of the UNPFII recommended that “the Department of Peacekeeping Operations prevent human rights violators and alleged human rights violators within the security forces of Bangladesh from participating in international peacekeeping activities under the auspices of the United Nations.”⁷⁵ Although eventually adopted by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in July 2011, Bangladesh vigorously objected to the recommendation,⁷⁶ going as far as to state at the UNPFII and the ECOSOC that it did not have an indigenous population (even though in 1982 the Bangladesh government had reported to the UN that it did).⁷⁷ This denial compounds the state’s blindness to the existence of its indigenous peoples,⁷⁸ including its indigenous women. From the perspective of the Bangladesh government, indigenous women not only seem to have disappeared from consideration in relation to justice, but have ceased to exist entirely.

Not only are indigenous women disadvantaged relative to nonindigenous women in Bangladesh, but in a context of perpetual conflict, indigenous women have become disadvantaged at the hands of their own indigenous men. The CHT Commission confirms the social consequences of sexual violence, noting that “Women who have been raped may be rejected by their husbands or families, or may not be able to get married. If they become pregnant they have to conceal this fact and must try to have an abortion. If a child is born, it is impossible for the woman to stay in her community as the situation is not accepted and she is ostracized. For these reasons, women who have been raped hesitate to talk about it at all, because they are scared or worried about the social stigma.”⁷⁹ In some cases concealing the rape is not even an option as it may have been committed in front of relatives, children, and fellow villagers, adding to the degradation and dehumanizing experienced by the victims.

Indigenous women thus suffer a double burden. They are affected by state-imposed

internal colonization, military occupation, oppression, and marginalization. As women they experience the inequality of their own indigenous society's masculine ethos. But, as discussed below, indigenous women also serve as powerful symbols of community, domesticity, and resistance.

<A>Constructing Gendered Identity and Difference in a Colonized Culture

Anthropologist and historian Willem van Schendel suggests that starting from the British period, "Bengali mores gradually came to be the standard against which the cultural and social life of the people of the Chittagong hills was judged" and the "Bengalization" of the hills set in with such force that British officials began to worry about it."⁸⁰ This Bengali-inflected identity remained more or less stable during the Pakistani period but became unstable and began to reverse direction in the 1970s as a response to the denial of hill people's identity and rights in the 1972 Constitution of the newly formed Bangladesh, which falsely assumed a single Bengali national identity for all.

From the early 1970s, the Jumma peoples of the CHT began to redeploy their cultural traditions to forge a more united identity. This identity is based to some extent on similarities they perceive among themselves, but also to a large extent on differences they perceive between themselves and the Bengali majority. In terms of similarities, the hill peoples share social and cultural forms that are linked to a life in the forested hills, particularly the *jum* or swidden agriculture that is practiced on the slope of the hills. Even though *jum* cultivation is becoming less common due to the long and deliberate campaigns of relocation and coercion to abandon the practice, *jum* culture has become a potent sign of unity. The differences the indigenous hill peoples perceive between themselves and the Bengali majority are manifold: the hill peoples practice shifting *jum* agriculture, and traditionally did *not* practice settled plains agriculture of the Bengalis; while the CHT indigenous inhabitants do not share a single culture, their culture is *not* Bengali; while the CHT indigenous inhabitants do not share a single language, their first language is *not* Bengali;⁸¹ and while the hill peoples do not share a

single common religion, they are *not* followers of Islam. As a result of this shared bond of difference, the eleven ethnically, culturally, linguistically, and religiously diverse indigenous peoples now collectively identify themselves as the Jumma people.⁸²

The recently adopted Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Bill of 2011, again fails to give constitutional recognition to the CHT peoples' separate identity, their rights, or the legitimacy of the CHT Accord. It restates that the national identity of the people of Bangladesh is Bengali. The amendment refuses the *adibasi* (indigenous) identity of the CHT peoples and many other *adibasi* communities on the plains.⁸³ It uses a number of derogatory terms to indicate that the country's indigenous peoples are either *upa-jati* (literally meaning a "sub-nation," itself a misnomer for the word "tribal" in Bangla),⁸⁴ *khudra jatisvattva* (small races/nations/peoples), *khudra sampradai* (small communities), or *khudra nrigoshthi* (small ethnic groups/sects),⁸⁵ all of which are rejected by the indigenous peoples of Bangladesh. The 2011 constitutional amendment also maintains Bengali as the state language without protection for other non-Bengali languages.⁸⁶

While the CHT has had a long experience of arbitrary bans on political, cultural, economic, and human rights activities, everyday traditional architecture, dress, and weaving inconspicuously worked to maintain a collective indigenous Jumma identity. In the decades after the 1970s these previously uncelebrated aspects of everyday life began to be deliberately deployed as signs of indigenous identity.

The ordinary domestic image of a "platform house" on timber and bamboo stilts, located either on top of a hill or on the slope of a hill, came to serve as a symbol of collective identity of the CHT people.⁸⁷ Although the traditional "platform houses" of the eleven indigenous groups are different to each other in their orientation, size, type, height of platform, and spatial layout, they nevertheless constitute a "family" of platform house typologies that remain immediately recognizable and significantly different to the traditional Bengali house, which sits on a raised earthen plateau in the plains.

The platform house, although increasingly rare, is a particularly appropriate signifier of the shared indigenous identity of the hill people: all groups have some form of the platform house; its layout embodies the life-world of the traditional *jum* cultivator which is very different to the plainland Bengali life-world; it marks a particular relation to the land which is treated as a shared resource rather than the subject of individual ownership; and it is built from resources that are harvested from the forest and are unobtainable in other environments. It is thus a signifier of shared dependence on the forest and marks a history of cultural oppression that was particularly directed against *jum* cultivation practices.⁸⁸

The backstrap loom, like the platform house, has also become a signifier of the shared indigenous identity of the hill people: all groups use the loom and its products; while there are differences in the weaving patterns and dress styles within the eleven indigenous groups, the backstrap-loom-produced textiles of the CHT are differentiable from both the products of the frame loom and mass-produced machine-made fabrics; as a living tradition, the backstrap loom embodies the life-world of the traditional *jum* cultivator where the lightness of the loom is “most compatible to their mode of production—shifting cultivation”;⁸⁹ and the backstrap loom has a close connection with the land as resources like cotton, natural colouring ingredients, and the materials for the loom apparatus⁹⁰ (bamboo, timber, rope, and leather) are harvested from the *jum* and forest, and are rarely available in other environments. The backstrap loom is thus a signifier of shared dependence on the forest and *jum* cultivation practices. The English term “backstrap loom” comes from its form: while the top bar of the loom is attached with a fixed object, the bottom bar is attached to the weaver by means of a strap (made of the leather of the water buffalo) placed around the back of the waist. Unlike the traditional frame loom found in the plains of Bangladesh, which is used extensively by both genders, the backstrap loom is predominantly a craft of indigenous women and traditionally regarded as inappropriate for men. While the traditional weaving of the CHT women’s backstrap loom is a relatively marginalized craft in production and economic return

compared to mass-produced machine or frame loom imitations of handcrafted indigenous textiles, Jumma women practice it not only to keep the skill alive by passing it down from generation to generation, but to signify “cultural resistance.”⁹¹ **<FIGURE 5.1>**

In the 1970s there was a revival among indigenous urban women, particularly Chakma and Tripura cultural activists, of wearing traditional dress and ornaments, and away from the previously dominant culture of wearing either the Bengali *shari*⁹² or Pakistani/Indian *shalwar-kamiz*. Wearing traditional dress and ornaments became not simply a fashion statement, but a statement of cultural identity.

The maintenance of such practices helps us to understand why the appearance in 2005 of an indigenous motion picture that drew upon the folk legends of the CHT was not an aberration. Rather, it was the outcome of a reterritorialization of indigenous people’s own traditional culture that had been occurring as a mode of resistance to Bangladesh’s colonization of the CHT. Indigenous women’s traditions played a key role in this resurgence of indigenous culture, as did the signification of indigenous women themselves.

The reterritorialization of indigenous people’s traditional cultural forms was reinforced in literature, particularly in poetry and songs. New cultural groups that emerged in the 1970s included the Giripur Shilpi Goshthi (“music of the mountain cultural group”); Jumia Bhasha Prachar Daptar (“Organization of dissemination of Jumia languages”); and Murolya Sahitya O Sanskritik Goshthi (“Hill literature and cultural group”). The growing trend toward publishing work in indigenous languages using Bangla script (in the absence of local orthographies) was often facilitated by small low-budget newsprint magazines released for the traditional April new year festival in the CHT. The magazines mostly included poems, but also contained songs, short stories, articles, plays, and folklore. They remain the major repository of cultural literature in the print media of the CHT.

The Giripur Shilpi Goshthi’s productions and reproductions included modern songs in diverse indigenous languages,⁹³ Bengali songs about the CHT,⁹⁴ and dances like the “*jum*”

dance of the Chakmas, the “*sangrai*” (new year) dance of the Marmas, the “*goraiya*” dance of the Tripuras, and the bamboo dance known as the “*cherukan*” to Lushais and Pankhuas, and the “*rokha*” to Bawms. There were also many cultural groups arising in townships and villages, often influenced by the *Girisur Shilpi Goshthi*, that practiced and performed indigenous songs, music, and dances. These cultural groups renewed the use of traditional musical instruments such as different types of flute, drum, *khengarang* (mouth organ), *singa* (horn), *duduk*, along with the harmonium, *tabla*, guitar, and mandolin.

However, the activities of the *Girisur Shilpi Goshthi* and others were disrupted and thwarted by the Bangladesh government. By the late 1970s a campaign of terror and intimidation resulted in many cultural activists being forced to leave the CHT, go underground, or flee the country. In the 1980s and 1990s arbitrary bans were imposed on CHT magazines such as *Radar*, one of a number of periodicals published in Bengali by CHT youth, and there were well-publicized incidents of many ordinary citizens facing interrogation, court action, and jail for selling or simply possessing such magazines.⁹⁵

A Chakma poem by Promode Bikash Karbari titled “*Jummobi Parani Mar*” (“*Jummobi, My Darling*”) is one of the most cherished cultural works of the 1970s. The poem was first published in *Burgee* (the Chakma name of a legendary bird once common in the forests of the CHT, now believed to be extinct), as the second publication of the *Jumia Bhasha Prachar Daptar* in 1973,⁹⁶ under the author’s pen-name Phelazeiye.⁹⁷ The poem captures the spirit of the time, highlighting the reterritorializing of gender within the frame of Jumma nationalism. Suhrid Chakma, a well-known CHT poet and literary critic, and Nandalal Sharma, a Bengali researcher on CHT literature, referred to the poem as “a milestone of modern Chakma poetry.”⁹⁸

Jummobi is the Chakma term for a maiden in the *jum*. The beauty and magic in the rhyme, stanzas, and words of the poem entice readers with the poet’s longing for a long-lost *jum*-based culture. The poet, Kabari, uses the character of *Jummobi* to depict the CHT’s

sociopolitico-cultural situation, articulating traditional images, codes, and symbols, and appropriating the role of gender to the demands of the time through poetic imagination. Karbari describes sites of domestic architecture and domesticity, but also reminds the reader of a past rich in the triumphs and tragedies of historical and legendary protagonists. Here is the English translation of the poem:⁹⁹

<EXT-L>

Jummobi, My Darling

I didn't know

That in your eyes

There's still a sea of tears

So much yet to shed

I didn't know

How you've lost Bodasogi's amorous eyes,

Her smiles so alluring, her look so charming,

So tender, so bewitching ...

O, tell me, Jummobi, my darling,

How you've got so changed so gradually,

In dress and look, in talk and style,

Exactly like a maiden Bengalee-fashioned? ...

O, my heart, my Champak beauty!

Can you tell me

How, when and where you and I

Have been lost, parted for a long, long time? ...

Wandering over hills and dales,

Over rivers and streams,

Roaming about far and near,

You've come back to me after a long long time,

*O, tell me, Jummobi, my darling,
Where have you been for such a long, long time? ...*

*You're back to me after a long time...
Can you remember—
Those days of yours and mine,
The songs and laughters, the talks and flirtation,
The mirth and merriments of our happy days of yore?*

*Perhaps, the sun was diving then,
The crickets droning on...
Perhaps, the burgees were on the wings
Over the far off blue mountains...
Perhaps, you were coming along the jum-path
On the ridge all alone at dusk ...
Perhaps then I asked you,
“What are you carrying, my darling,
In the kallong at your back?”
Then you blushed in shame, your head lowered...*

*You've come back to me after a long time...
Can you remember—
The moonlit night on the eejore of the jum-house?
The overflowing sounds of flutes, singas and flat duduks?
The music of khengarongs, so endearing, so moving?*

*Can you remember—
The kabarok jum on the top of the mountains?
Perhaps, then you were waiting for the dear one
(me ...),*

*Perhaps your eyes were sleepless,
Looking over the path ahead...
Can you remember*

The kabarok jum on the top of the mountains? ...

No, no, no,

We've nothing now;

Now those days are no more ...

No more are those romance, mirth and merriments.

What's use thinking of those days of romance,

Mirth and merriments? ...

No, no, no,

We've nothing now

Now we've no Radhamon,

So, we've no Dhanpudi,

Only you and I have been parted for so long.

What's the use thinking of those days of romances,

Mirth and merriments?

So, I tell you,

Don't cry anymore like Tannyabi, the young girl;

Don't smile the depressed smile of Sandobi ...

So, I tell you,

Be smart and tuck your pinon tight,

that's so new, so fine a jhigaphool pattern,

And put on your red, red lovely khadi decently.

And so, I tell you,

You'll be my Dhanpudi,

And I'll be your Radhamon ...

Then after the night has passed,

When the day breaks,

You'll see the sun rising,...

The white cotton flowers all over the jum dancing...

*Then it'll seem to you
The songs and laughter, the talks and flirtatiousness,
The mirth and merriment of our happy days of yore
Have come back;
And then, the world will seem to you still smiling ...*

The prelude of the poem focuses on the tearful eyes of the poet's darling Jummobi. It laments how Bengali mores have come to be the standard for measuring Jummobi, leading her to forget her own uniqueness—the modest beauty of a sensibly clothed (“tuck your *pinon* tight” and “put on your ... *khadi* decently”) industrious woman of the fields. The poet addresses Jummobi as the “Champak beauty,” reconnecting her with a forgotten past, the prosperous ancient legendary Chakma city named Champak Nagar. It appears that after wondering a long time and enduring the suffering arising from neglecting and forgetting her own identity, Jummobi has perhaps returned to her own, rightful self.

The interlude of the poem portrays an atmospheric sunset in the deep forest where crickets/cicadas are droning, beautiful Burgees are flying toward the distant mountains, while Jummobi, at dusk, is walking the *jum* path along the mountain ridge carrying a work-basket called a *kallong* on her back. There is rejoicing in anticipation of Jummobi's return, which marks the return of the idyllic communal life in the hills. There are memories of sloping *jum* field of *kabarok*, a delicious, fragrant rice variety grown only in abundance at the top of the mountain. There are memories of moonlit nights, listening to the flute, *singa*, *duduk*, and *khengarong*, on the *eejore*, the open bamboo deck at the front of the *jum* platform house. There is mourning for the absence of the legendary hero Radhamon, the brave *senapati* (general) of Champak Nagar, and beautiful Dhanpudi, the childhood friend, lover, and, later in life, partner of Radhamon.¹⁰⁰

The climax of the poem, which is brazen with hope that there could be a resurrection of lost *jum* culture, portrays a sunrise with the *jum* covered in white *sudophul* (cotton

flowers), and full of song and laughter. The poet, acknowledging the strength required for resistance, urges Jummobi not allow herself to be the victim of injustice like the tragic heroines Tannyabi¹⁰¹ and Sandobi,¹⁰² but to be the hardworking young woman wearing a pristine traditional *pinon*¹⁰³ of *jighaphul*¹⁰⁴ pattern, and a red *khadi*,¹⁰⁵ who remains the faithful Dhanpudi of Radhamon. Jummobi, the protagonist in the poem, is identified here not only as a darling maiden but as the symbol of the land, the CHT itself. The poet's depiction of the land as "partner" and "lover," here deployed toward a new nationalism, contrasts the usual depiction of the land in Bengali literature as "mother."

The poet presents regret, forgetfulness, and neglect with the metaphor of the sunset, and hope and aspiration with the sunrise over the *jum*. All the emotional elements in the piece are, in a way, also a reflection of the poet's own experience, the poet's literary journey, because this was Karbari's first published poem in the Chakma language. This marks a general shift in the 1970s when indigenous CHT poets and writers, particularly Chakma, Marama, and Tripura, were attempting to write and publish in their own indigenous languages rather than in other hegemonic languages, particularly Bengali.¹⁰⁶

By the 1980s, with transmigrant arrivals to the CHT reaching invasion proportion, the perspective of indigenous cultural activists had dramatically altered. Just as the populace recognized the necessity of resisting the Bengali military and settlers by force and formed the *Shanti Bahini* guerilla militia, so too literary tropes became more militant. Karbari's later poetry reflects this more desperate mood. Where once he saw hope in the simple resurrection of a joyful, "feminine-gendered" *jum* culture, a later poem, "Arekbar Jagi Ut Bir Runu Khan" ("Rise Once More, O Brave Runu Khan") presented below, calls for a "masculine-gendered" militarist solution. In contrast to the invocation of the legendary lovers Radhamon and Dhanpudi in his earlier poem, this poem invokes the power of the famous hero, General Runu Khan. Historically, General Khan was the general of two successive Chakma rajas, Raja Sherdoulat Khan and Raja Jan Bux Khan, who led the eighteenth-century "Chakma

Resistance” against the British.¹⁰⁷ Jummobi, the beautiful but hardworking female figure of the land called forth in the first poem, has been replaced by an evocation to release the wrath of Khan on the “swine” and “monkeys” invading the hills. Only with the success of this masculine adventure, it seems, will the sunrise again reveal the beauty of the *jum* fields.

<EXT-L>

*Rise Once More, O Brave Runu Khan*¹⁰⁸

Rise up,

Jumma hero, O brave Runu Khan!

Look around and see

The blue hill

The seven-colored dream of yours!

Again you see

The cotton, paddy, teel ...

The harvest of blood, sweat and toil

Of your simple industrious Hill Jummas

Who once fought -----

Are plundered, grasped, snatched away,

By the swine from the very nearby plains,

And the monkeys from the far far away lands.....

So, don't sleep any more,

Don't make any delay,

O, Runu Khan,

The saviour of the Jummas.....

Breaking up your sleep of one hundred years,

Rise up

Once More from your sleep....

Swearing by fire,

Absorbing the spirit of the sun,

Taking the strength of thunder,

O Runu Khan, the Jummas' pride,

*The Jumma hero,
Rise once once more
In every house
Of this Jummaland!*

*Come once more,
String your great bow,
Twang with poisoned arrows ----
And let all the beasts cunning and shameless
Die, cripple and flee!*

*Come once more,
Kindle the red fire of yours,
And let the cursed beasts die, cripple and flee
And let red land be redder*

*And then,
Let ever-fresh yellow sunshine
Come down
On this blue mountain land
Of your dream*

The poem appears to recognize that the earlier hope of returning to a traditional *jum*-based culture has become naively romantic. In a sense, the twinning of the rape of the land and the sexual violence against women exposes the vulnerability of both the land and the culture, engendering a militant masculine response. To return to the tranquility of traditional life, the invader must first be killed or repelled. It is questionable, however, whether this masculine, militarist orientation actually perpetuates the culture of violence, sharpening the gender divisions that appeared to be less rigid in the more communal view of the earlier poem, leaving women again in the uncelebrated role of maintaining (domestic) cultural traditions.

<N-1>Chapter 5. Indigenous Women and Culture in the Colonized Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh

¹ For further discussion of Dulu Kumuri and Kalpana Chakma, see Glen Hill and Kabita Chakma, “Writing Post-Nationalist Histories Within the Walls of Nationalism: The Case of Indigenous Peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh,” *Journal of the Oriental Society of Australia (JOSA)* 39-40 (2007-2008): 250-63.

² Amnesty International, AI Index: ASA 13/07/96, Bangladesh: Kalpana Chakma (f), aged 23, indigenous rights activist, July 1, 1996, and AI Index: ASA 13/09/96, further information on UA 162/96 (ASA 13/07/96, July 1, 1996), August 28, 1996; two leaflets by Ain O Salis Kendra (ASK) of Bangladesh: ASK Appeal June 24, 1996, and ASK Appeal for Action, Abduction of Hill Women’s Federation Leader—Recent Developments, July 18, 1996.

³ European Parliament, DOC_EN\RE\311\311501, G.1, October 23, 1996; Australian Hansard, October 2, 1997, 7434, <http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/dailys/ds021097.pdf>.

⁴ Radhika Coomaraswamy, special rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-Third Session, E/CN.4/1997/47/Add. 4, page 2, January 30, 1997; Australian Red Cross, letter No. TR/330/98 275 dated 26.5.98 and letter No. TR/330/99/ 2341/C dated 24.2.99.

⁵ Kabita Chakma interview with director Tarun Chakma, October 25, 29, 2006.

⁶ There are at least forty-six indigenous groups in Bangladesh, thirty-five of which live outside the CHT. The indigenous population constitutes 1.08 percent of the national population. “Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights in Practice, a guide to ILO Convention No. 169, Programme to promote ILO Convention No. 169 (Pro 169)” (International Labour Standards Department, 2009), 17.

⁷ Some research nominates a different number of indigenous groups in the CHT. For instance, Mro are erroneously listed as two groups, Mro and Murang, in the 1991 national census; and

the two Tripura groups—Usui and Riang—are often treated as two different groups: Usui as Tripura, and Riang as a separate group.

⁸ Sugata Chakma, *Parbatya chattagramer bibhinna bhasha o upabhashar moulik shabda sangraha ebang bishleshan purbak tader prathamik shrenikarn* (Collection of basic vocabulary of different languages and dialects of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and their primary classification), *Upajatiya Gabeshana Patrika* (Research Journal of the Tribal Cultural Institute), 3 (Rangamati: Tribal Cultural Institute, 2004): 9-68. While all groups of necessity use Bangla script, some also have traditional scripts, some use Roman script, and some have recently developed their own scripts.

⁹Manle Mro, who developed the Mro script, also founded the Krama religion between 1985 and 1986.

¹⁰ Ilira Dewan. “*Panchadash Sangshodhani: Bangali Jatyabhiman O Upekhita Adibasi* (15th Amendment: Bengali Nationalism and Neglected Indigenous Peoples),” *Prothom Alo*, July 3, 2011.

¹¹For precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial history of the CHT see: Raja Devasish Roy, “Questions on Political & Constitutional Crises in the Chittagong Hill Tracts: Seeking Answers in History & Historiography,” paper presented at international seminar on Chittagong Hill Tracts: Enlightening Different Aspects, Bangladesh Itihas Society and the Department of History, University of Chittagong, March 31–April 1, 2011); Willem van Schendel, *A History of Bangladesh* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 26, 213. For precolonial and colonial history of the CHT see Willem van Schendel, ed., *Francis Buchanan in Southeast Bengal (1798): His Journey to Chittagong, the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Noakhali and Comilla* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1992). Willem van Schendel et al., *The Chittagong Hill Tracts: Living in a Borderland* (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2000). For precolonial history, A. M. Serajuddin, “The

Chakma Tribe of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in the 18th Century,” *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* 1 (1984): 90-98; Suniti Bhushan Qanungo, *Chakma Resistance to British Domination, 1772-1798* (Chittagong: Shanti Press, 1998).

¹² As the resistance was led by two successive Chakma rajas, historians referred it to as the “*chakma bidroha*” or “Chakma Resistance.” Qanungo, *Chakma Resistance to British Domination*; Ratan Lal Chakraborty, “Chakma Resistance to Early British Rule,” *Journal of the Bangladesh Itihaas Samiti* (Bangladesh Historical Studies) 2 (1977): 133-56. But there were other indigenous communities in the region that also joined the resistance. Most notably a famous Marma aristocrat and warrior named Kheju Roaza and other indigenous communities who were referred to as Kukis by the British.

¹³ Kabita Chakma, “Kalindi Rani: 19th Century Chakma Queen Regnant,” *New Age*, <http://newagebd.com/newspaper1/op-ed/10677.html>.

¹⁴ Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, *Life Is Not Ours: Land and Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts Bangladesh* (Copenhagen: IWGIA, May 1991), 42.

¹⁵ Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity means Chittagong Hill Tracts United Peoples Party. *Jana Sanghati Samity* or JSS is its popular name.

¹⁶ Lars-Anders Baer, *Study on the Status of Implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord of 1997*, Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Tenth session, New York, May 16-27, 2011, UN Economic and Social Council, E/C.19/2011/6.

¹⁷ Baer, *The Status of Implementation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord*, 16.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 15-16. “Operation Uttoron” was a counter-insurgency measure that conferred military officers with concentrated powers. It remains in force despite there being no evidence of insurgency since the ceasefires of early 1990s.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 5.

²⁰ Shapan Adnan, *Migration Land Alienation and Ethnic Conflict: Causes of Poverty in the*

Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh (Dhaka: Research and Advisory Services, 2004), 48-50.

²¹*Jumma Sambad Bulletin* (Jumma News Bulletin) 6, 16th year (Rangamati: Parbatya Chattgram Jana Samhati Samiti, August 9, 2006), 15.

²² Abdul Barkat et al., *Socio-economic Baseline Survey of Chittagong Hill Tracts* (Dhaka: UNDP, Bangladesh, 2009), vi–vii.

²³Raja Devasish Roy, “Forests, Forestry and Indigenous Peoples in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh,” paper presented at Workshop on the Rights of Tribal and Indigenous Peoples, India International Centre, New Delhi, February 23-25, 1996), 5-6.

²⁴Adnan, *Migration Land Alienation*, 57.

²⁵Bangladesh District Gazetteers: Chittagong Hill Tracts (Dacca: Establishment Division, Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, 1975), 100, 126.

²⁶Amena Mohsin, “State Hegemony,” in *The Chittagong Hill Tract: Life and Nature at Risk*, ed. Philip Gain (Dhaka: SEHD, 2000), 68.

²⁷Roy, “Forests, Forestry and Indigenous People,” 3.

²⁸Mohsin, “State Hegemony,” 68.

²⁹Prior to British colonization, most land in the CHT was treated as “commons.” Commons still exist in forms such as Village Common Forests (VCFs). For VCFs, see Hari Kishore Chakma, “The Village Common Forests Management of Indigenous Peoples,” in *JAC'er 25 barsha purti sankalan* (Collected edition celebrating JAC's 25th anniversary, 2005), ed. Shishir Chakma (Rangamati: Jum Aesthetic Council, 2005), 25-32; Sing Yong Mro, “*Adibasider oitihjhyagata grameen sadharan ban babasthapana o kaprupara sangrakhita ban* (Traditional Village Forest Management of Indigenous Peoples and Kaprupara Reserve Forest),” *Jangfa* (“Love” in Bawm language), ed. Litan Chakma Annada (Rangamati: Banjogichara Kishore Kishori Kalyan Samiti, 2011), 59-70. Shapan Adnan and Ranajit

Dastidar, *Alienation of the Lands of Indigenous Peoples in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh* (Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission and IWGIA, 2011), 37.

³⁰Mro, "Traditional Village Forest Management," 59.

³¹Roy, "Forests, Forestry and Indigenous Peoples," 9.

³²Adnan and Dastidar, *Alienation of the Lands of Indigenous Peoples*, 60,

<http://indigenouspeoplesissues.com/index>.

³³Ibid., 59.

³⁴Kapaeeng Foundation, "Bangladesh: Indigneous Peoples Demand Stop to Land Acquisition for Setting Up Military Garrison," *Indigenous Peoples Issues and Resources*, May 12, 2012.

³⁵Adnan and Dastidar, *Alienation of the Lands of Indigenous Peoples*, n 134, 79.

³⁶Ibid., 81-84; Adnan, *Migration Land Alienation*, 94.

³⁷Adnan and Dastidar, *Alienation of the Lands of Indigenous People*, 97; Amena Mohsin, *The Politics of Nationalism: The Case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh* (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1997), 178.

³⁸There were thirteen massacres between 1979, the year of implementation of the transmigration program, and 1992, five years before the signing of the Accord. Mark Levene, "The Chittagong Hill Tracts: A Case Study in the Political Economy of 'Creeping Genocide,'" *Third World Quarterly* 20, 2 (1999): 339-69; Bhumitra Chakma, "The Post-Colonial State and Minorities: Ethnocide in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 48, 3 (July 2010): 291; A briefing on Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Bangladesh to Human Rights Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Jumma Peoples Network of the Asia Pacific, September 8, 2005, Canberra.

³⁹The Government Task Force 2001 listed 90,208 indigenous families as internally displaced. The estimate in this chapter is based on a family size of 3.3, much less than the 5.1 given by

the 2009 UNDP survey. Barkat et al., *Socio-Economic Baseline Survey of Chittagong Hill Tracts*, 32; Pinaki Roy and Shantimoy Chakma, "Hurt Not Healed at Hills: 13 Years of Peace Accord Gone, Land Not Returned to Most Families," *Daily Star*, December 2, 2010.

⁴⁰The Bengali population in the CHT was 9.09 percent in 1951 (4 years after the British withdrawal), 19.41 percent in 1974, and 48.57 percent in 1991. Adnan, *Migration Land Alienation*, 57.

⁴¹Adnan, *Migration Land Alienation*, 12.

⁴² Kabita Chakma and Bina D'Costa, "The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT): Diminishing Conflict or Violent Peace?" in *Diminished Conflicts in Asia and the Pacific*, ed. Edward Aspinal, Robin Jeffrey, and Anthony Regan (London: Routledge, 2012, forthcoming).

⁴³ Statement by spokesperson of HR Catherine Ashton on the acts of violence in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, European Union, Brussels, February 26, 2010, A 26/10; "Bangladesh: Investigate Army's Alleged Involvement in Human Rights Abuses in Chittagong Hill Tracts," February 26, 2010, Amnesty International, Index No: ASA 13/006/2010; "Calm Returns to Chittagong Hill Tracts, But Fear Remains," *Survival: The Movement for Tribal Peoples*, March 2, 2010, <http://www.survivalinternational.org/news/5608>; Pinaki Roy, "Bangladesh Erupts in Ethnic Violence," *Open India: India and Beyond*, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/openindia/pinaki-roy/bangladesh-erupts-in-ethnic-violence>, March 5, 2010; "Indigenous Land Dispute Turns Deadly in Bangladesh," Amnesty International Public Statement, April 20, 2011, AI Index: ASA 13/003/2011; Staff Correspondent, "Fear Grips Ramgarh, Manikchari," *New Age*, April 18, 2011.

⁴⁴ Adnan and Dastidar, *Alienation of the Lands of Indigenous Peoples*, 65.

⁴⁵ Amena Mohsin, "Democracy and Minorities," discussion at a forum, Dialogue on Democracy: Majorities and Minorities, Bangladesh, State of Democracy in South Asia Study,

July 29-30, 2004, Chittagong, http://www.democracy-asia.org/dialoguereports_bangladesh_chittagong.htm, accessed July 29, 2004; Mohsin, *The Politics of Nationalism*, 49-75.

⁴⁶Mohsin, *The Politics of Nationalism*, 179.

⁴⁷2001 data were presented as 2011 data by the BBS. Data in the 2011 census are contested by many organizations.

⁴⁸Marc Ferro, *Colonization: A Global History* (London: Routledge, 1997), 1.

⁴⁹Mohsin, *The Politics of Nationalism*.

⁵⁰Bina D'Costa, *Nationbuilding, Gender and War Crimes in South Asia* (London: Routledge, 2010), 4.

⁵¹ Conflicts of Israel-Palestine and El-Salvador are examples; *ibid.*, 8.

⁵² van Schendel, *A History of Bangladesh*, 173; Afsan Chowdhury. "Is Reconciliation with Pakistan a Realistic Goal?" *BdNews24.com*, <http://opinion.bdnews24.com/2011/03/26/is-reconciliation-with-pakistan-a-realistic-goal/>, accessed March 26, 2011.

⁵³ Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, *Life Is Not Ours*, 109.

⁵⁴ Meghna Guhathakurta, "Women's Narratives from the Chittagong Hill Tracts," in *Women, War and Peace in South Asia: Beyond Victimhood to Agencies*, ed. Rita Manchanda (New Delhi: Sage, 2001), 12.

⁵⁵ *Kalpana Chakma O Ainer Shasan* (Kalpana Chakma and the rule of law), *Jai Jai Din*, July 8, 1996.

⁵⁶ Adnana and Dastidar, *Alienation of the Lands of Indigenous Peoples*, 68-69.

⁵⁷ In December 1992, the Bangladesh government agreed to dismantle the Jumma cluster villages in order to continue its peace talks with the JSS. Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, *Life Is Not Ours: Land and Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts*, Update 2 (Copenhagen: IWGIA, April 1994), 6.

⁵⁸ Ibid.,109.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.,107.

⁶³ Ainoon Nahar and Prashanta Tripura, “Violence Against Indigenous Women,” in *Between Ashes and Hope: Chittagong Hill Tracts in the Blind Spot of Bangladesh Nationalism*, ed. Naeem Mohaimen (Dhaka: Drishtipat Writers’ Collective, 2010), 194.

⁶⁴ “Autonomy for Peace in the CHT,” leaflet by CHT Women’s Federation, Bangladesh, at UN World Conference on Women, NGO Forum on Women, August 30–September 10, 1995, Beijing.

⁶⁵ Jumma Net, *Chittagong Hill Tracts White Paper: The Issues of Conflict, Human Rights, Development, and Land of the Indigenous Peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh 2003-2006*, February 10, 2009, Tokyo.

⁶⁶ Hana Shams Ahmed, “Multiple Forms of Discrimination Experienced by Indigenous Women from Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Within Nationalist Framework,” paper presented at Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women Consultation, Kuala Lumpur, January 11-12, 2011) 7; Jumma Net, *Chittagong Hill Tracts White Paper*; “A Brief Account of the Human Rights Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Bangladesh,” in *Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights Report in Asia 2008: Bangladesh Burma Lao* (Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP) Foundation), 32-33.

⁶⁷ Bina D’Costa, “Marginalized Identity: New Frontiers of Research for IR?” in *Feminist Methodologies for International Relations*, ed. Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacquie Ture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 129-52.

⁶⁸ D’Costa, *Nationbuilding, Gender and War*, 79.

⁶⁹“There is a need to avoid appropriation and exacerbation of their sufferings,” Nayanika Mukherjee interview, *New Age Xtra*, December 10-12, 2010.

⁷⁰One exception was *Ekattarer Dingulo* (Days of '71), published in 1986, a memoir by Jahanara Imam, an educationalist, author, and mother of Rumi, a freedom fighter and martyr.

⁷¹In 1992, Ekattarer Ghatak Dalal Nirmul Committee (Committee for the Uprooting of the Traitors and Collaborators of 1971), headed by Jahanara Imam, co-organized a people's court (*gana adalat*) as a symbolic condemnation of the wartime criminals. Organizations that archived documents and testimonies of the wartime experience of *biranganas* include the Liberation War Museum, Prajanma Ekattur (Genre 71), Ain-O-Salish Kendra (Legal Aid Centre), Odhikar (Rights), and so on. Books published relating to *biranganas* generated awareness about the wartime atrocities nationally and internationally. They include Nilima Ibrahim, *Ami Birangana Balchi* (I Am the War Heroine Speaking) (Dhaka: Jagrati Prakashan, 1998); Shariar Kabir, ed., *Tormenting Seventy One* (Dhaka: Nirmul Committee, 1999); *Narir Ekattor O Juddha Parabarti Katthya Kahini* (Women's '71 and Postwar Narratives) (Dhaka: Ain O Salish Kendra, 2001); D'Costa, *Nationbuilding, Gender and War*.

⁷²“UN to Help Bangladesh Crimes Trial Planning,” *AFP*, April 7, 2009.

⁷³“War Crimes law “falls short,” *bdnews24.com*, March 15, 2010; “Bangladesh: Guarantee Fair Trials for Independence-Era Crimes, Amendments to Tribunal Rules Fall Short of International Standards,” *Human Rights Watch*, July 11, 2011.

⁷⁴“Bangladesh Court Begins First War Crimes Trial,” *Jurist*, August 10, 2011.

⁷⁵ E/C.19/2011/6, para 58 (a); “UNPFII Ends with Call for Screening Military HR Record for Peacekeeping,” *New Age*, May 28, 2011.

⁷⁶ The Bangladesh government urged deletion of para 58 (a) of E/C.19/2011/6, “UN ECOSOC Rejects Bangladesh Government's Challenge to UNPFII's Mandate to Deal with CHT Accord,” press release by the International Council for the Indigenous Peoples of CHT

(ICIP-CHT), July 30, 2011; “CHT Commission Asks ECOSOC to Adhere to UNPFII Report,” *New Age*, July 30, 2011; “UN Gives Go-By to Bangladesh Worries,” *Bdnews24.com*, July 31, 2011.

⁷⁷“Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations,” submitted June 20, 1982, to UN Economic and Social Council by Special Rapporteur Mr. José Martínez Cobo, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2/Add.6, <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/spdaip.html>.

⁷⁸Zafar Sobhan, “Missing the Point at the UN,” *Sunday Guardian*, October 23, 2011.

⁷⁹Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, *Life Is Not Ours*, 107-8.

⁸⁰van Schendel, “The Invention of the “‘Jummas’: State Formation and Ethnicity in Southeastern Bangladesh,” *Modern Asian Studies* 26, 1 (February 1992): 110.

⁸¹Bengali was deemed by the 1972 Bangladesh Constitution to be the state language.

⁸²van Schendel, “The Invention of the ‘Jummas,’” 95-128; Glen Hill and Kabita Chakma, “Using Architectural History to Invent a Nation: The Case of the Indigenous Architecture of the Chittagong Hill Tracts,” *Formulation Fabrication: The Architecture of History* (Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Conference of the Society of Architectural Historians, Australia and New Zealand, November 2000, 401-10.

⁸³ “Indigenous Groups Reject Amendment: Say Their Identity Lost, Basic Rights Denied,” *Daily Star*, July 1, 2011.

“Awami League Chooses to Be a Slave, Not Master, of History,” editorial, *New Age*, June 30, 2011.

⁸⁴ The Bengali word “upajati” is a derogatory term meaning “sub-nation.”

⁸⁵ The term “khudra nrigoshthi” was introduced with the Khudra Nri Goshthi Sangskritik Protisthan Ain (Small Ethnic Group Cultural Institutions Act), which was gazetted on April 12, 2010, replacing the word “upajati.” The three new terms “khudra nrigoshthi,” “khudra jatisvattva,” and “khudra sampradai,” however, are belittling. The Bangladesh government

is recently reported to be considering complete removal of the word “indigenous” from all official documents. “Bangladesh: Battle Lines Drawn Over ‘Indigenous’ Label,” *IRIN*, accessed September 2, 2011, <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=93640>

⁸⁶ Devasish Roy Wangza, “Constitutional Reform and Adivasis,” *New Age*, August 11, 2011.

⁸⁷ Hill and Chakma, “Using Architectural History to Invent a Nation.”

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 407.

⁸⁹ Prabartana Enjoyment’s Blog, <http://prabartanaenjoyment.wordpress.com/most-striking-characteristics-of-indigenous-tribal/>.

⁹⁰ The apparatus of a common backstrap loom in the CHT consists of a front bar, a breast bar, a sword, a health bar, a circular bamboo bar, a lease rod, and a backstrap.

⁹¹ Arshi Dewan Roy, *Indigenous Textiles of the Chittagong Hill Tracts* (Rangamati: Charathum, 2005), 39.

⁹² At least from the colonial period, Chakmas and Tripuras have been influenced by a Calcutta-oriented Bengali culture, including in their dress. Urban Lushai and Bawm women wore western style clothes. Unlike urban Chakma, Tripura, Lushai, and Bawm women, other indigenous women wore predominantly traditional dresses.

⁹³ In 1974, the Girisur Shilpi Goshthi produced its first publication, *Singa*, a collection of modern Chakma, Marma, and Tripura songs.

⁹⁴ It also included Bengali songs by Rabindranath Tagore, Kazi Nazrul Islam, and others.

⁹⁵ Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission, *Life Is Not Ours*, 11. *Radar* (Dhaka: Radar Editing and Publication Committee, Hill Literature Forum, Victory Day issue, December 16, 1991), 8.

⁹⁶ Sugata Chakma, ed., *Burgee* (Rangamati: Jumia Bhasha Prachar Daptar, 1973). The poem is included in two edited volumes: Hemal Dewan et al., eds., *Ranyaphul: Changma Shreshtha Kabita* (Ranyaphul: Chakma Best Poems) (Rangamati: Moniswapan Dewan,

2006), 55-56; and Sugata Chakma, ed., *Parbatya Chattagramer Bingsha Shatabdir Nirbacita Kabita* (Selected Poems of the Twentieth Century from the Chittagong Hill Tracts) (Rangamati: Tribal Cultural Institute, 2008), 160-61.

⁹⁷The literal meaning of the Chakma word “phelazeiye” is “fallen one” (in the sense of fallen leaves), which the poet coined to resemble Rabindranath Tagore’s pen-name and the title of one of his songs, “jhara-pata,” meaning “littered leaves.” Karbari is also a writer and playwright. The bulk of his work remains unpublished.

⁹⁸Suhrid Chakma, “*Kabita O Adhunik Chakma Kabitar Patabhumi* (Poetry and a Background to Modern Chakma Poetry),” in *Girinirjhar* (Rangamati: Tribal Cultural Institute, February 1987), 70; Nandalal Sharma, ed., *Chakma Kabita* (Chakma Poems), (Dhaka: Suchipatra, 2008), 13.

⁹⁹The English translation, and Chakma version of the poem transcribed into Roman script (attached as Appendix A), **{is this to be included?}** both by the poet himself, are published here for the first time.

¹⁰⁰Radahmon and Dhanpudi are central characters in “Radhamon-Dhanpudi Pala,” one of the most popular Chakma ballads (*pala*). According to the story, Radahmon was conscripted to go to war to protect Champak nagar from the attacks of Maghs, a derogatory name for Arakanese pirates. Radahmon later became the indomitable general of Jubaraj Bijoygiri, crown prince of the Chakmas. It is said that the complete ballad, 50 sections and subsections, takes *genkhulis* (bards) over seven days and seven nights to sing. Sugata Chakma et al., eds., *Radhamon Dhanpudi* (Rangamati: Tribal Cultural Institute, 2011).

¹⁰¹ Tanyabi, the beautiful but tragic heroine who was prevented from marrying her love Punagchan and forced to marry a widower, is said to have gone insane with sorrow and cried so much that her tears formed the oxbow lake, “Tanyabir Firti” meaning “Tanyabi’s Return,” which is now submerged under the Kaptai Lake.

¹⁰² Sandobi is the protagonist of a nineteenth-century epic poem, *Sandobir baromach*, by Pandit Dharmadhan Chakma. Trapped by the jealous raja into having an illegitimate child by another man and forced to live in shame, Sandobi is known for her sorrowful smile.

¹⁰³ *Pinon* is the skirt worn by Chakma women.

¹⁰⁴ A beautiful yellow flower from a vine producing a zucchini-like fruit called *jhinge*.

¹⁰⁵ *Khadi* is the breast cloth worn with a *pinon*. While the Chakma *ranga khadi* (red *khadi*) was traditionally worn by young women, different colors and shades are now fashionable and are also used as an *orna*, or scarf.

¹⁰⁶ *Biju* (New Year Festival), the first publication of the Jumia Bhasha Prachar Daptar in 1972, published work in Chakma, Marma, and Tripura languages. *Luro* (Torch), the first publication of the Murolya Sahitya O Sanskritik Goshti, also in 1972, was divided into two parts: work in Bengali and work in indigenous languages. There were, however, at least three published poets who wrote modern Chakma poetry before the 1970s resurgence. Probodh Chandra Chakma's (Phiringchan) book of poetry, *Alsi Kabita* (Indolent Poetry), was published in 1926. Chunilal Dewan (1911-1955), the first formally trained artist from the CHT, wrote Chakma poetry and songs, many published in the literary magazine *Gairika*, the first magazine of its kind, flourishing in the CHT under the royal patronage of Rani Benita Roy. *Gairika* was named by Tagore, and was published irregularly from 1933 to 1951. The third poet was Mukunda Talukdar, whose poem *Puran Kadha* (Narratives of the Past) was published in *Gairika* in 1947. Other poets in the 1950s and 1960s, including Salil Roy, wrote in their own languages but were not published until later. Sugata Chakma, *Bangladesher Chakma Bhasha O Sahitya* (Chakma Language and Literature of Bangladesh) (Rangamati: Tribal Cultural Centre, 2002), 112-13; Sugata Chakma, ed., *Parbatya Chattagramer Bingsha Shatabdir Nirbacita Kabita* (Selected Poems of the Twentieth Century from the Chittagong Hill Tracts) (Rangamati: Tribal Cultural Centre,

2008), *bhumika* (Preface) and 123-40; Chunilal Dewan, *Ranyaphul: Changma Shreshtha Kabita* (Ranyaphul: Best Chakma Poems), 13, 19, 22; Pavel Partha, “Nipirita Jatir Nipirita Sahitya” (Oppressed Literature of Oppressed Peoples), in *Apeng*, ed. Ripan Changma et al. (Rights in Kakborok language of the Tripuras) (Rangamati: Jum Aesthetic Council, 2010), 11-20.

¹⁰⁷ Runu Khan is also referred to as Ramu Can and Ronu Cawn, a mountaineer, and the leader of a band of Kukis by the British.

¹⁰⁸ “Rise Once More, O Brave Runu Khan” is the English translation of the Chakma poem “Ar Ekbar Jagi Udh O Bir Runu Khan” by P. B. Karbari himself, and is published here for the first time. The Chakma version, transliterated in Bengali, was first published in Anupam Chakma, ed., *Ray, Biju sankalan* (Biju Issue) 3 (Dhaka: Dhaka Tribal Students Union, 1984).